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On a world scale, the economies of the Caribbean are small, 
open, dependent, and undiversified; in consequence, they are 
very susceptible to external shocks. This is not a new situation. 
Since the time of their colonization, the Caribbean economies 
have never been self-sustaining: Structured as plantation econo- 
mies, they specialized from the outset in the export of primary 
commodities and have had to import almost everything else, 
including food. 
Following the end of World War II, however, the Caribbean 
region underwent a major transformation. Most of the larger 
countries and many of the small islands pursued industrialization 
strategies in an attempt to overcome the colonial order which 
had previously confined them to the production of primary 
goods. Over the following quarter-century, the key objectives of 
these programmes were modernization and diversification, and 
these goals were pursued primarily through industrialization. In 
addition, mechanization was introduced into the agricultural 
export sector. For social as well as economic reasons, health and 
education programmes were launched with the objective of 
attaining levels of health and education similar to those prevail- 
ing in the industrialized nations. This was also the period when 
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most anglophone countries in the region as well as Suriname 
(formerly Dutch Guiana) achieved nationhood. 
During this period of economic and social transformation, 
most Caribbean countries lost a large proportion of their popu- 
lations through migration. Indeed their integration into the 
world economy occurred both at the local level (through chang- 
ing patterns of production and adaptation to technology and 
markets) and abroad (through the absorption of the Caribbean 
labour surplus into the economies of the Northern metropoles 
where so many Caribbean emigrants settled). 
In this postwar period, definite advances were achieved in 
the health and educational fields. Standards of living increased 
in most countries during the 1950s and the 1960s, although in 
the 1970s and 1980s about one-half of the countries in the region 
experienced either economic stagnation or decline. Nevertheless, 
after some forty years of effort to change the colonial economic 
order, and despite some achievements, no country in the region, 
nor the region as a whole, has developed a truly diversified econ- 
omy. Caribbean economies remain very dependent on a narrow 
range of specialized niches - tourism, offshore business services, 
tropical fruits, for example - within the global economy. Some 
of the smaller countries have been very successful in exploiting 
these niches, but many of the other Caribbean countries are 
fighting poor economic performances, budget deficits, and bal- 
ance of payments problems. 
Today, most Caribbean countries face two related challenges: 
first, structural adjustment, or how to maintain income in a rap- 
idly changing global economy; second, the development of trade 
blocs, or how to deal with the powerful trade blocs emerging in 
Europe and North America. How will the Caribbean region and 
individual Caribbean countries integrate into the new world 
economy? Will standards of living fall or remain stagnant, as has 
been the case in many countries over the past ten to fifteen years? 
Will income and social conditions improve as they did in some 
of the smaller countries of the region over the same period? Bear- 
ing in mind that emigration from the region played a huge role 
Table 1 Labour force in agriculture and G D P  per capita since World War II 
Population Percentage of population in the agricultural \ 
Land area Beg. 1990 sectoi5 G D P  per capita (II) in US dollars 
(sq. km.1 (00Os)t 1940s/50s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Cuba 
Dominican Republic 
Haiti 
Puerto Rico 
Jamaica* 
Trinidad & Tobago* 
Barbados* 
Guyana* . 
Grenada* 
Saint Vincent' 
Saint Lucia* 
Dominica* 
Antigua* 
Saint Kitts-Nevis* 
Montserrat' 
Belize* 
Bahamas* 
Bermuda 
U.S. Virgin Islands 
110,922 
48,442 
27,750 
8,897 
11,424 
5,128 
430 
215,000 
344 
3 84 
616 
787 
442 
352 
102 
22,965 
13,935 
53 
344 
10574.9 Of,Est. 
6591.0 Aut.Est. 
5939.0 Est(1) . - 
3514.0 C 90 
2317.3 C 91 
1229.3 C 90 
256.8 C 90 
794.2 UN 
90.6 C 91 
106.4 C 91 
133.2 C 91 
72.2 C 91 ' 
65.9 C 91 
42.0 C 91 
11.0 c 91 
185.2 C 91 
253.2 C 90 
58.0 C 91 
101.7 C 90 
41.7 36.7 UN 
69.9 67.5 
85.5 83.0 E 
39.2 24.2 
48.3 39.7 
29.1 22.1 
33.3 26.4 
48.2 37.1 
51.9 43.3 
57.7 42.0 
60.0 53.1 
42.8 52.0 
47.7 34.3 
58.5 47.6 
65.6 48.9 
46.2 41.9 
27.1 16.1 
20.6 5.6 
6.0 4.0 E 
30.7 25.6 
52.2 45.7 UN 
80.4 67.3 
8.0 2.9 
32.2 31.3 UN 
16.3 10.2 
17.0 9.5 
29.6 25.1 
34.1 27.7 
29.9 30.9 
40.5 32.1 
40.0 37.0 
11.8 5.0 E 
35.2 29.3 
20.4 10.1 
37.0 36.6 
7.7 5.8 
1.6 1.3 
1.2 1.1 
245 E 
238 UN 
75 
790 UN 
433 
604 
378 
299 
135 
163 
189 
178 
47 8 
217 
374 E 
274 
1,017 
1,954 
706 
446 E 
366 UN 
93 
2,089 UN 
748 
865 
759 
378 
229 
210 
357 
250 
695 
313 
543 UN 
395 
2,133 
3,449 
3,522 
1,427 UN 
1,218 UN 
292 
4,935 UN 
1,228 
6,048 
3,350 
747 
744 
584 
942 
676 
1,383 
920 
1,990 UN 
1,181 
3,475 
10,933 
7,476 
NA 
830 
370 
NA 
1500 
3610 
6540 
330 
2190 
1720 
1900 
2210 
4600 
3330 
6800 
1990 
11420 
NA 
Curaçao , 
Aruba 
Suriname 
Guadeloupe 
Martinique 
French Guiana 
m , 
444 148.0 Aut.Est. 8.0 E 1.8 1.0 E 0.4 1,259 UN 1,376 UN 6,160 UN NA 
193 61.1 Of.Est. 5.0 E 1.4 0.7 E 0.2 1,259 UN 1,376 UN 6,160 UN NA 
163,265 402.5 Of.Est. 35.0 E 29.9 UN 24.8 UN 19.9 UN 382 784 2,807 3050 
1,705 385.5 C 90 49.9 48.7 22.1 15.0 372 E 874UN 4,242 UN NA 
1,100 358.8 C 90 47.6 40.1 18.2 11.3 406 E 973 UN 4,429 UN NA 
91.000 113.8 C 90 45.0 E 28.0 17.3 15.0 275 E 646E 3.132UN NA 
Caribbean Islands 
Caricom countries 
Total 
32408.6t 
5557.1 
33904.3t 
N O T E S  
NA Not available 
* Commonwealth Caribbean-Caricom-countries 
t Including 6 countries not listed here. These are (population in thousands at the beginning of 1990 in parentheses): Anguilla (7.7), British Virgin Islands (15.9), 
$ Populations at 1 January 1990 were estimated from the following sources: C 89, 90, 91: Census results taken those years; 0f.Est: Official Estimate; UN: United 
I Percentage of the population occupied in the agriculture sector: The data presented here for most countries are derived from the results of the censuses 
Turks & Caicos (11.3), Cayman Islands (25.5), Bonaire (9.5), and Sint Maarten (28.9). 
Nations estimate; Aut.Est.; Author Estimate; Est(1): Haiti, United Nations, Case Studies on Population, no 25, 1990. 
undertaken since the 1940s or 1950s in these countries. In the absence of census results, the missing data have been estimated (E) or taken (UN) from the 
Statistical Yearbookfor Latin America and the Caribbean, 1988 edition (United Nations/EcLAc, February 1989). 
II Gross domestic product per capita: The data presented here for most countries are taken from the World Bank EPD Data Bank (1986). In the absence of World 
Bank data, the data have been estimated (E) or taken (UN) from the United Nations Statistical Yearbooks (the 1981 Yearbook for 1960 and 1970, and the 1985/ 
86 Yearbook for 1980). It should be noted that for Cuba, all figures are crude estimates (i.e., the 1980 figure refers to the net material product divided by the 
rate of exchange of the Cuban peso given by the UN and the mid-year population. 
. 
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in its post-World War II transformation, how will future emigra- 
tion be affected by either successful or unsuccessful integration? 
No one has the perfect crystal ball for forecasting the future, 
but the trends of the 1990s point to several strong hypotheses. 
The present economic niches (tourism, offshore banking, tax 
havens, and such) have their limitations and cannot serve as 
major sources of revenue for all the Caribbean countries. Most 
of these countries must therefore continue to try to adapt to the 
new world economy - at varying paces depending on their past 
development and economic performance. Population move- 
ments are likely to continue to play an important role in that 
process. But there are likely to be substantial variations from 
country to country in the magnitude, the type, and even the 
direction of these migrations. 
T H E  C A R I B B E A N  E X O D U S  
The loss of population due to net migration out of the Caribbean 
region during the 1980s has now been calculated at about 1.4 
mi1lion.I This is somewhat less than the I .7-million loss estimated 
for the 1970s.~ It thus appears that the net migration from the 
region between 1950 and 1990 totals 5.6 million. This figure is 
equal to 32 per cent of the region’s population in 1950, and 16 
per cent of its population in 1990. No other region of the world 
experienced such heavy losses from sustained emigration during 
this period. 
As might be expected, the larger absolute losses through out- 
migration are generally found to be from the countries with the 
larger populations, but there are some aberrations. Overall, the 
major sending countries are Haiti and Jamaica, with losses of 
I See Jean-Pierre Guengant, ‘Current demographic trends and issues,’ unpublished 
paper presented at the Population and Development Symposium, organized by 
the University of the West Indies, the United States Agency for International 
Development, and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, Antigua, 
19-22 July 1992. 
z See Alan B.  Simmons and Jean-Pierre Guengant: ‘Caribbean exodus and the 
world system’ in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, and H. Zlotnik, eds, International 
Migration Systems: A Global Afi$roach (Oxford: Clarendon Press ~ggz), 94-1 14. 
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about one million each over the past forty years, followed by 
Puerto Rico (about 800,000), Cuba and the Dominican Republic 
(about 700,000 each), then Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago 
(about 300,000). Looking at migration rates, a different picture 
emerges. The highest rates belong to five small Commonwealth 
Caribbean (Caricom) states: the four Windward Islands - Gre- 
nada, Saint Vincent, Saint Lucia, and Dominica - and Saint 
Kitts-Nevis. For these countries, net migration losses between 
1950 and 1990 represent more than 80 per cent of their 1950 
populations. In fact all of the thirteen Caricom countries, with 
the exception of the Bahamas - one of the few countries with a 
net migration gain over the period -were severely.affected. The 
weighted rate of migration loss for Caricom countries stands at a 
high 62 per cent of the 1950 population compared with 32 per 
cent for the Caribbean region as a whole. 
Caribbean migration has been massively directed to the 
Northern metropoles, mainly to the United States and Canada. 
The European metropoles - the United Kingdom, France, and 
the Netherlands - have received less than one million Caribbean 
migrants over the past forty years.3 The movement to the United 
Kingdom was limited to British subjects from what were then 
that country’s Caribbean colonies; it began after the Second 
World War and was terminated in 1962.4 The movements to 
France and the Netherlands have been restricted to holders of 
French and Dutch passports from the French and the Dutch 
Antilles and from French Guiana and Suriname (which became 
independent in 1g75).5 In contrast, the United States and Can- 
3 See Jean-Pierre Guengant, ‘Les émigrations caraïbéennes’ in La  Grande Encyclo- 
pédie de la Carai’be. IX:  Économie (Pointe à Pitre: Éditions Caraïbe 1990). 
4 The Commonwealth Immigration Act adopted in 1962 ended free access to the 
United Kingdom for citizens of the Commonwealth. As the result, emigration 
mal. See Britain‘s Black Population (London: Heinemann 1982). 
5 On the Caribbean migration to Europe, see ‘Les Antillais en Europe’, a special 
issue of Revue internationale des Migrations européennes 3( 1987). On emigration 
from the Dutch Antilles and Suriname to the Netherlands, see Ronald Tas and 
Johanes Fredericus, ‘La population originaire du Suriname et des Antilles néer- 
landaises aux Pays-Bas’ in this issue. 
I 
c from Commonwealth countries to the United Kingdom after ~ g G z  has been mini- 
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ada have admitted 2.7 million legal immigrants from all Carib- 
bean countries, mainly since the mid-1960s. If Puerto Rican emi- 
gration to the United States is added to this total,6 we can say 
that about 3.5 million ‘documented’ Caribbean migrants have 
settled in North America. 
Compared with the magnitude of emigration from the 
region, intra-Caribbean migration appears minor. A plausible 
estimate of intra-Caribbean migration (based on a permanent 
change of residence) is around half a million for the past forty 
years.7 This is about double the number of Caribbean-born indi- 
viduals who were found in a 1980 enumeration to be living in a 
Caribbean country other than their country of birth. Such an 
estimate would mean that intra-Caribbean population move- 
ment formed about I O  per cent of the overall Caribbean migra- 
tion during the past forty years. Moreover, the countries of origin 
and destination for these migrants are restricted to only a few 
states in the region. Haiti is the main provider of intra-Carib- 
bean migrants, even though the majority of Haitian emigrants 
go to North America.s The next major source of intra-Caribbean 
migrants are the four Windward Islands, but here, too, the pat- 
tern is the same: multiple countries of destination but with a 
majority going to the United States and Canada. 
Only a handful of Caribbean countries have registered net 
migration gains over the past forty years as a result of intra- 
regional movements. These are, in descending order of increase: 
the Bahamas, French Guiana, the United States Virgin Islands, 
Sint Maarten, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, 
and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Generally, the influx of Ca- 
- 
- 
6 As American citizens, Puerto Ricans can move freely to the mainland United 
States. The figure for Puerto Rican emigration to the mainland United States 
used here is the net migration balance derived from Puerto Rican census and civil 
registration data. 
7 See Alan B. Simmons and Jean-Pierre Guengant, ‘Recent migration within the 
Caribbean region: migrants’ origins, destinations and economic roles,‘ in The  
Peopling of the Americas, Proceedings, International Union for the Scientific 
Study of Population (Veracruz 1gg2), vol. 2 ,  419-41. 
8 See James Allman and John May, ‘Haitian migration: 30 years assessed,’ Migra- 
tion Today ro(no I ,  1982). 
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d -  
ribbean migrants to these countries has accompanied a substan- 
tial immigration from the metropoles. 
T H E  D E T E R M I N A N T S  O F  E M I G R A T I O N  
The population movements I have outlined were prompted by a 
variety of factors, whose relative importance has differed over 
time. Previous research designed to explain Caribbean emigra- 
tion rates between 1950 and 1980, using a regression model, 
identified five independent variables.9 Three, variables were 
measures of economic opportunity in the Caribbean: (I) the per- 
centage of the labour force in the agricultural sector at the 
beginning of each decade, which provided an indication of vari- 
ations in levels of development and conditions ‘pushing’ people 
to seek opportunities elsewhere; (2) gross domestic product per 
capita at the beginning of each decade, providing a crude meas- 
,Ure of national wealth and of the capacity to provide employ- 
ment and income at home; and (3) change in the percentage of 
agricultural workers during the decade, as an indicator of the 
pressure on internal labour markets to accept workers shifting 
from the agriculture sector to the services or industrial sector. 
The other two -variables were selected to take account of the 
effect on migration movements of, first, international commu- 
nity and kinship linkages and, second, national immigration 
rules. This was done after a simple qualitative assessment 
through the selection of two dummy variables: ( I )  ‘link,’ reflect- 
ing the importance ‘of previous movements and the consequent 
sizeable expatriate community, I o  and (2) ‘access,’ reflecting free 
versus regulated access to the main receiving countries. I I  
g See Alan B.Simmons and Jean-Pierre Guengant, ‘Caribbean exodus: explaining 
country variation in net-migration balance’ unpublished paper, O R S T O M ,  Pointe 
à Pitre/Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean, York Univer- 
sity, Toronto, May 1990, 28 pages. 
Antilles, and Puerto Rico, and ‘o’ for the large Spanish and French Creole-speak- 
ing countries: Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. 
I I  ‘Access’ was coded ‘I’ for countries with privileged access in a given decade or ‘0’ 
for countries with controlled access to any metropolitan destination over the dec- 
ade. 
I O  ‘Link‘ was coded ‘I’ for all anglophone countries, the French and the Dutch 
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The model using these five variables explains 69 per cent of 
the variation in net migration rates over the 1970s for the 2 1  
countries with net migration losses during the 1950-1980 
period.IZ If one excludes Curaçao and Aruba -whose emigration 
patterns are largely shaped by the fortunes and misfortunes of 
their giant oil refineries - the model explains 73 per cent of the 
variance for the remaining I g countries. Interestingly enough, 
when using only three variables - percentage of the labour force 
in agriculture, gross domestic product per capita, and ‘link,”s 
the R-square (corrected for degrees of freedom) is only slightly 
less: 0.66 against 0.73 .  The reason for this is fairly straightfor- 
ward: all three measures of economic opportunity are inter-cor- 
related, such that inclusion of all three helps increase the R- 
square only slightly. But whereas dropping the variable ‘change 
in percentage of labour force in agriculture’ has virtually no 
impact on the results, dropping either ‘percentage of labour 
force in agriculture’ or ‘gross domestic product per capita’ has a 
major impact in reducing the variance explained. When one or 
the other of these two variables is dropped, it appears that retain- 
ing ‘percentage of labour force in agriculture’ provides the high- 
est result. This is particularly true for the 12 Caricom countries 
which experienced net migration losses during the 1970s. In their 
case, ‘percentage of labour force in agriculture in 1970’ only 
explains 59 per cent of the variation in net migration rates 
between these countries! 
Indeed, the decline in the agriculture sector in the Caribbean 
over the past forty years - both in plantation and peasant 
agriculture‘l - is a key factor in explaining the timing and mag- 
12 Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, 12 Caricom countries (the 
Bahamas are excluded because they experienced a net migration gain), Guade- 
loupe, Martinique, Suriname, Curaçao, and Aruba. 
changeable. So, the use of ‘link‘ instead of ‘access’ in the three-variable model 
does not affect the results. 
14 On the economies of the Caribbean, see George Beckford, ed, Caribbean Econ- 
omy: Dependence and Backwardness (University of the West Indies 1975) and 
Lloyd Best, ‘Outlines of a model of a pure plantation economy,‘ Social and Eco- 
nomic Studies ~~(Sep tember  IgGS), 2S3-32G. 
13 ‘Link‘ and ‘access‘ as they were coded appeared to be very similar, and inter- 
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Table 2 Migration balances, Caribbean countries, 1950-89 
Migration balances (000s) Total 
Country 1950-9 1960-9 1970-9 1980-9 1950-89 
Cuba 
Dominican Republic 
Haiti 
Puerto Rico 
Jamaica 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Barbados 
Guyana 
Grenada 
Saint Vincent 
Saint Lucia 
Dominica 
Antigua 
Saint Kitts- Nevis 
Montserrat 
Belize 
Bahamas 
Bermuda 
U.S. Vigin Islands* 
Curaçao 
Aruba 
Suriname 
Guadeloupe 
Martinique 
French Guiana 
- 10.0 
- 54.0 
- 70.0 
-469.8 
-165.1 
-0.4 
-20.2 
-4.3 
- 12.4 
-9.3 
- 13.4 
-5.5 
-2.7 
-6.1 
-4.5 
- 0.8 
13.6 
0.0 
-1.0 
-4.5 
- 13.0 
-4.4 
-3.4 
-4.5 
2.5 
-475.0 
- 175.0 
-220.0 
-211.9 
-289.5 
-110.1 
-38.2 
-53.1 
- 18.5 
-20.0 
- 17.8 
-9.7 
-5.0 
- 16.9 
-2:6 
-7.1 
23.9 
0.0 
26.5 
-18.3 
- 9.9 
-27.8 
-25.3 
-30.9 
8.2 
-222.6 
-220.0 
- 350.0 
-41.1 
- 270.8 
-94.7 
- 14.7 
-129.5 
-21.4 
-15.1 
- 18.5 
- 12.5 
-7.1 
- 8.0 
-0.8 
- 19.5 
3.9 
-2.3 
1.8 
- 16.9 
-5.5 
- 97.6 
-50.3 
-46.5 
7.9 
- 19.9 
-240.0 
-400.0 
-110.1 
-246.5 
-75.0 
- 10.7 
- 121.6 
- 19.5 
-13.1 
- 13.0 
- 15.8 
-7.1 
-7.4 
-1.6 
- 14.7 
7.4 
-1.1 
-13.1 
-20.4 
- 5.6 
-33.5 
14.0 
-4.3 
25.7 
-727.5 
- 689.0 
- 1040.0 
-832.9 
-971.9 
-280.2 
-83.8 
- 308.5 
-71.8 
-57.5 
-62.7 
-43.5 
-21.9 
-38.4 
- 9.5 
-42.1 
48.8 
- 3.4 
14.2 
-60.1 
- 34.0 
- 163.3 
-65.0 
- 86.2 
44.3 
Caribbean islands -856.2 -1644.2 -1413.1 -1202.8 -5116.3 
Caricom countries -231.1 -564.6 -608.7 -538.6 -1943.0 
Caribbean region -863.2 -1724 -1651.8 -1346.9 -5585.9 
N O T E :  Migration balances: The migration balances presented here represent the difference 
between the expected population without migration at the end of the decade 
considered (obtained by adding the population at the beginning of the decade and 
the natural increase observed or estimated during the decade) and the estimated 
actual population at the end of the decade or at the beginning of the next decade. 
nitude of the Caribbean exodus to the metropoles. In countries 
where the absence of subsistence agriculture offered few alter- 
natives for agricultural workers faced with a deterioration in 
earnings and employment conditions on the plantations, massive 
emigration started early. Puerto Rico and Montserrat are typical 
examples. But in countries with a sizeable peasantry at the end 
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of World War II, such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Dom- 
inica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Guyana, and Belize, 
emigration only developed later when the crisis in the plantation 
sector deepened , making subsistence agriculture more precari- 
ous, and when the first groups of emigrants in the metropoles 
facilitated further emigration. 
Though very useful in providing a better understanding of 
the determinants of Caribbean migration, this regression model 
has several shortcomings. First, it was designed only for countries 
experiencing net and massive emigration. Second, it is not rele- 
vant for those countries which have never had a significant agri- 
cultural sector, or whose agricultural sector has long since dis- 
appeared. Third; it tends to play down the importance of 
external factors, such as the immigration regulations of the 
receiving countries and the role of the diasporas in the dynamics 
of migration. 
T H E  C A R I B B E A N  I N  T H E  
N E W  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  D I V I S I O N  O F  L A B O U R  
The elimination or marginalization of Caribbean agricultural 
workers and peasants should be interpreted as a further step in 
the integration of the Caribbean countries, and the Caribbean 
as a whole, into the global economy. In the new international 
division of labour, the Caribbean occupies an ambiguous place. ‘ 5  
It has some relative advantages for the development of certain 
services activities: tourism, offshore banking, and such. But it is 
not really an attractive place for investments in offshore indus- 
trial activities for a variety of reasons including higher salary 
levels than in other Third World countries, a less docile labour 
force, and, in several countries, especially those with low wages, 
political instability. Indeed, the major relative advantage of the 
Caribbean is its reasonably well trained and healthy work force. 
15 See Steven E. Anderson, The Americas in the New International Division of 
Labor (New York: Holmes & Meier 1985). See also Jean-Pierre Guengant and 
Alan B. Simmons, ‘Globalisation et nouveaux régimes démographiques dans la 
Caraïbe,’ paper presented at the colloquium, ‘Fécondité et Insularité,’ I 1-15 May 
1992, Saint-Denis de la Réunion, II pages plus graphs and tables. 
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Since the early movements within the Caribbean Basin (to Pan- 
ama, Cuba, and so on) and to the United States in the latter part 
of the nineteenth century, the people of the Caribbean had 
developed a ‘culture’ of migration. I6 They were therefore ready 
to enter the American and Canadian labour markets when these 
two countries needed workers and opened their doors to immi- 
gration from the Third World in the 1960s. 
However the integration of the Caribbean into the North 
American economy through the incorporation of its labour sur- 
plus from the agricultural sector is uneven. Haiti is the most 
characteristic example of incomplete integration. First, about 
two-thirds of its labour force still works in agriculture, mainly at 
the subsistence 1evel.lY Second, most of the adult population is 
illiterate. Third, despite the volume of the emigration from 
Haiti, net emigration since 1950 still represents a low percentage 
of the resident population by Caribbean standards - 18 per cent. 
Yet, even here, the integration process is proceeding. In the 
I 970s, manufacturing activities developed in free zones around 
Port-au-Prince to take advantage of the low wages and lack of 
safety and social protection. Primary school enrolment, mainly 
through private institutions, has increased significantly over the 
past two decades. Finally, even though they are latecomers in the 
Caribbean exodus, the Haitians now constitute the largest group 
of Caribbean emigrants. However, in 1980 the number of legal 
immigrants in the receiving countries who were born in Haiti was 
small compared with the total net migration loss since 1950.’~ 
This means that most Haitians - between 65 and 75 per cent - 
are illegal migrants in the countries in which they reside, partic- 
ularly in the United States, their main destination. 
By contrast, Barbados is among a number of anglophone 
16 See Dawn Marshall, ‘The history of Caribbean,migrations,’ Caribbean Review 
17 See Jean-Pierre Guengant, Haiti, United Nations, Department.of International 
II(no I, 1982). 
Economic and Social Affairs, Case Studies in Population Policy, no 25, S T / E S A /  
S E R . R ~ ~  (New York 1990). 
Antilles et de la Guyane, no 6(April 1g88), 16-19, Institut national de la Statis- 
tique et des Études économiques - Antilles-Guyana, Pointe à Pitre, Guadeloupe. 
18 See Jean-Pierre Guengant, ‘L’exil haitien,’ ANTIANE:  Revue économique des 
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Caribbean countries which is more integrated into the interna- 
tional economy, but its integration has occurred largely through 
the export of its labour. Less than IO per cent of its labour force 
is now employed in the agricultural sector. Primary education is 
universal and secondary school enrolment is high by Third 
World standards. Tourism is the leading economic sector. Emi- 
gration peaked in the 1960s and has since declined. Also, Bar- 
bados attracted some immigrants from neighbouring poorer 
islands - particularly Saint Vincent and Saint Lucia - as well as 
some returnees. Despite these inflows, net migration loss since 
1950 represents as much as 40 per cent of the island’s 1990 pop- 
ulation. In sharp contrast to the Haitian migrants, however, the 
number of immigrants born in Barbados who were legally admit- 
ted to the United States and Canada since 1950 suggests that 
more than 80 per cent of the Barbadian emigrants in these coun- 
tries are legal immigrants. 
Lastly, the Bahamas and the United States Virgin Islands are 
examples of countries which successfully took advantage of new 
economic niches. Therefore their integration into the interna- 
tional economy has been achieved primarily through the devel- 
opment of tourism and other services, and not through the 
export of labour. Over the past forty years, both countries have 
registered massive immigration from other Caribbean countries 
and from the metropoles. But this migration peaked in the 1960s 
and has since declined. In fact, during the 1980s, the United 
States Virgin Islands recorded a massive net emigration because 
of the end of the hotel building boom and a slowdown in the 
tourism sector. Despite positive migration balances, both these 
countries nevertheless lost sizeable numbers of emigrants to the 
American labour market over the past forty years. 
S M A L L  IS  N O T  O N L Y  B E A U T I F U L ,  
I T  IS  A L S O  B E T T E R  
The uneven integration of the Caribbean economies into the 
global economy is reflected in huge differences in gross domestic 
product per capita: from a mere US$300 or US$400 for Haiti 
. *  
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and Guyana to more than US$~o,ooo for Bermuda, the Baha- 
mas, the United States Virgin Islands, the French Antilles, and 
some other small islands. Recent levels of performance for Car- 
ibbean economies are also diverse and reflect the success or fail- 
ure of their efforts to benefit from a mixed international environ- 
ment and to adjust to the emerging new international division of 
labour. 
Interestingly, the smaller countries have fared much better 
than the larger ones. The smallest countries of Caricom - the 
Windward Islands, Antigua, Saint Kitts-Nevis, Montserrat, 
Belize, and the Bahamas as well as the British Virgin Islands and 
Anguilla - were foremost among the high-growth economies, 
recording rates in excess of 5 per cent a year between 1981 and 
1990.~9 This success was due largely to vibrant and growing tour- 
ism industries coupled with, in the case of the Windwards, good 
results in the banana sector. By contrast, during the 1980s the 
economies of the larger countries either contracted (Guyana, 
Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago) or experienced low growth 
rates of o to 2 per cent a year (Barbados, the Dominican Repub- 
lic, and Suriname) or, at best, moderate growth rates of 2 to 3 
per cent a year (Jamaica, Cuba, and Puerto Rico).zo The lower 
economic growth in the larger countries is surprising because 
they have relatively diversified economies and often possess a sub- 
stantial manufacturing sector. 
Taking into consideration population growth and inequality 
of income distribution, these statistics suggest that at least in the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Suriname, and the 'most developed 
countries' of Caricom (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guy- 
9 19 See Wendell A. Samuel, 'Socio-economic scenario for the Eastern Caribbean,' 
unpublished paper presented at the Population and Development Symposium, 
International Development, and the United Nations Fund for Population Activi- 
ties, Antigua, 19-22 July 1992. 
20 See Barbara Boland, 'Population dynamics and development in the Caribbean,' 
paper presented at the Meeting of Government Experts on Population and Devel- 
opment in Latin America and the Caribbean, Saint Lucia, 6-9 October 1992. 
c organized by the University of the West Indies, the United States Agency for 
9 This section draws on Boland's paper as well as that of Samuel (ibid). 
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ana, and perhaps most recently Barbados), people have become 
poorer in recent years. In the other countries of the Caribbean, 
the economic growth of the 1980s has meant a substantial 
increase in gross domestic product per capita. In a number of 
small economies devoted to tourism and offshore business ser- 
vices, such as Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, and 
the British Virgin Islands, gross domestic product per capita is 
now above U S $ ~ o , o o o . ~ ~  In countries with little or no tourism, 
such as the Windward Islands and Belize, it is around US$2,000. 
During the 1980s, most of the countries with poor or modest 
economic performances have had to implement severe structural 
adjustment programmes imposed by international financial 
institutions. The measures governments adopted - a lowering of 
expenditures on social services, a reduction (and sometimes elim- 
ination) of subsidies for basic consumer goods, and a steady 
devaluation of their currencies which increased the prices of 
imported (basic and other) commodities - have made life worse 
for most of their people. Likewise, debt servicing has been a 
constant drain on the foreign exchange earnings of these coun- 
tries, reducing the level of investment as well as growth potential. 
Governments have thus been forced to divert resources away 
from local expenditure, resulting in disproportionate cuts to 
social services. Guyana and Jamaica suffered particularly 
severely from externally imposed adjustment programmes. For 
the most part the faster growing economies have been spared the 
debilitating effects of externally imposed programmes. But many 
of them have undertaken self-imposed adjustment programmes 
to adapt their fiscal operations to levels dictated by adverse inter- 
national economic development. During the 1980s, many of 
these countries achieved surpluses on their current account, 
which enabled them to undertake social infrastructure and other 
investment projects. The emphasis was more on productive cap- 
ital expenditure and slightly less on social investment. Thus, the 
21 See Courtney N. Blackman, Tourism and Other Services in the Anglophone Car- 
ibbean, Working Paper 26 (Washington: Commission for the Study of Interna- 
tional Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, March 1990). 
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programmes may have resulted in a slight shift in the balance 
away from social infrastructure. However for these countries, on 
average, government expenditures on health and education 
remained roughly constant. 
Despite the varying economic performances of Caribbean 
countries, virtually all of them experienced dramatic increases in 
their unemployment rates.z2 This has even been the case for 
countries which had massive emigration rates. Indeed, one major 
consequence of the integration process at work over the past two 
or three decades has been to make increasing numbers of Carib- 
bean workers available for external labour markets - mainly in 
the metropoles, but also in the ‘new niche’ economies of the 
region. 
What then is likely to be the impact of the emergence of two 
major trading blocs - tbe European Community’s single market 
and the North American free trade area - on the Caribbean 
economies and on migration from the Caribbean? 
I N  B E T W E E N .  T H E  T W O  B L O C S  
The Caribbean is already an economic battlefield for these two 
blocs. The French and Dutch authorities have long tried to use 
‘their’ respective Antilles as ports of redistribution for their goods 
and services, not only to the rest of the Caribbean but also to the 
North American and Latin American markets. American ship- 
ping and airlines companies use Puerto Rico as a base for export- 
ing their products in the region, and Puerto Rico’s airport has 
become a compulsory transit stop for many North American 
tourists going to other Caribbean destinations, including the 
French and the Dutch Antilles. Moreover, a newly established 
direct air link between Puerto Rico and Europe is likely to pro- 
vide increasing competition for the European airlines which 
bring tourists from Europe to the Caribbean. 
The ‘banana war’ is another example of the confrontation of 
a: 
* 
I 
22 See Carmen Diana Deere, co-ordinator, Zn the Shadows of the Sun (Boulder C O :  
8 Westview 1990). 
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the two blocs in the region. The bananas grown in the French 
Antilles and in Caricom countries (mainly the Windward 
Islands) benefit from protected markets in France and United 
Kingdom respectively (for the latter under the Lomé Agree- 
ment). American banana companies expanded their production 
in Cameroon and, under the Lomé agreement, entered the 
French market at the expense of producers in the French Antil- 
les. Germany, which imports - for roughly half the price - 
bananas produced by American companies based in Central and 
South America, has recently challenged the protection enjoyed 
by Caribbean bananas. These disputes are not fully settled, but 
it is far from certain that Caribbean bananas will continue to 
enjoy protected access to the European market. 
Turning to the manufacturing sector of the Caribbean econ- 
omy, the prospects for its three components - agro-processing, 
import substitution, and the enclave sector - are not promis- 
ing.23 The agro-processing sector constitutes a potentially strong 
base for the industrial development of the region, but it is char- 
acterized at the moment by varying degrees of efficiency because 
of primitive technology and the variability of the quality of the 
inputs. The import-substitution sector, geared to local and 
regional markets, is characterized by a high level of imported 
content in the production process. The World Bank asserts that 
this sector is highly uncompetitive and can only survive with 
extremely high tariff protection. Lastly, the enclave sector is 
dominated by foreign garment and highly specialized electronics 
firms. They export mainly to the United States and are compet- 
itive in the global market. But enclave manufacturing firms can 
be a source of uncertainty in the orderly development of an 
industrial sector. These firms are inclined to move frequently 
seeking advantage and they cater to very volatile export markets 
where recession and technological changes can decimate the sec- 
tor in a short space of time. They also employ mainly female 
workers at low wages, workers who may be more and more 
23 Samuel, ‘Socio-economic scenario for the Eastern Caribbean.’ 
i .  
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tempted to migrate to North America to earn more, possibly in 
better jobs. 
C O N C L U S I O N  
The continuing integration of the Caribbean region into the 
global economy over the past fifteen to twenty years has resulted 
in an increased vulnerability for the Caribbean economies. Even 
though several countries in the region have been very effective in 
taking advantage of new economic niches, these successes are 
fragile. Moreover, similar developments cannot be envisaged for 
all countries of the region, especially the larger ones. Competi- 
tion within the region between the two international trading 
blocs may create new opportunities for economic development in 
certain countries, but probably at the expense of other countries 
in the region. This competition may also work to the disadvan- 
tage of the region, as the controversy over Caribbean banana 
production demonstrates. 
Increased economic vulnerability is likely to go hand in hand 
with increased mobility for people, a logical outcome of 
increased international economic integration. Population move- 
ment in the region is likely to be diverse as well and to pose new 
challenges to both receiving and sending countries. 
For the countries with a substantial percentage of their 
labour force still in the agricultural sector, emigration will con- 
tinue, whatever the immigration policies in the potential receiv- 
ing countries may be. The numbers of emigrants from Haiti and 
the Dominican Republic are likely to be much higher than the 
numbers the receiving countries are prepared to accept. Severe 
tensions between countries and within the receiving communities 
can be expected. However, the need for unskilled labour, both 
in the more developed countries of the region and in the United 
States and Canada, may help to reduce these tensions. The 
future of Cuban migration is difficult to predict, but any changes 
in the present regime are likely to lead to large numbers of 
Cuban emigrants. For those countries which have already lost 
many emigrants to North America, emigration will continue to 
* 
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be a mobility strategy for many youths, irrespective of the eco- 
nomic performance of the sending or the receiving country. And 
for many of the earlier Caribbean emigrants a permanent or 
temporary return home will be an increasingly attractive option. 
This is true both for those still of working age and for those who 
have retired and possess an American or Canadian pension. 
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